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I.   INTRODUCTION  
Arbitrators are typically entrusted with complete decisional authority when 
conducting arbitrations.1 This authority is accompanied by a certain level of trust and 
responsibility. The stakes are often high for the parties, who depend on a well-reasoned 
decision by the arbitrator on the merits. Also, as the Supreme Court has noted, “we 
should . . . be even more scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than 
judges, since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts 
and are not subject to appellate review.”2 Moreover, the conduct of arbitrators plays an 
integral role in public perception of the arbitral process.3 These aspects of the arbitrator’s 
function, as well as the current prevalence of arbitration as a method for adjudicating 
disputes,4 illustrate the importance of ensuring that arbitrators act in accordance with 
established ethical standards. 
Accordingly, with such considerable impact and importance, one might expect 
that a comprehensive body of ethical standards governing the conduct of all arbitrators is 
currently in effect and strictly enforced. However, much to  the surprise and disdain of 
many, there are no such standards in existence.5 Considering that professionals 
performing similar roles, such as judges, are bound by stringent codes of ethics,6 this is 
an alarming fact. 
The current lack of universal arbitrator ethics standards can be attributed to, 
                                                
* Shari Maynard is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 See Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private Arbitration and the Need for 
Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1345 (2002) (arbitrators have “complete autonomy 
over the dispute resolution process.”). 
2 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
3 Robert A. Holtzman, The Role of Arbitrator Ethics, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 481, 483 (2009) 
(noting that an arbitrator’s conduct is “crucial to public confidence” in the arbitral process). 
4 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's 
Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 950 (2002) (discussing the growth and prevalence 
of arbitration). 
5 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional 
Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 468 (2004) (stating that notwithstanding “[v]oluntary and aspirational” 
codes of conduct, “arbitrators and provider institutions are not subject to specific regulatory standards or 
public oversight.”). 
6 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011) (requiring that judges act in compliance with 
certain ethical standards while executing their functions). 
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among other things, the private nature and autonomous status of arbitration. Despite the 
benefits of ethical standards, there are significant limitations that are presently 
insurmountable absent radical and unlikely change. Scholars, state legislatures, and 
professional organizations have made various proposals and initiatives aimed at 
addressing this issue, such as establishment of a state arbitrator licensing board 
responsible for implementing a code of ethics, and enhancement of judicial review of 
awards where parties allege arbitrator impropriety.7 Though such suggestions have merit, 
they have yet to be universally adopted and as such, have little effect on the arbitrators’ 
practice. However, there is recourse, albeit limited, currently available to parties to 
redress past or prevent future arbitrator misconduct. 
Accordingly, Part II of this article will describe some of the fundamental ethical 
standards generally regarded as essential to the arbitrator’s practice, Part III will explore 
the reasons for the current lack of universal arbitrator ethics rules, Part IV explains the 
benefits and limitations of uniform standards, Part V briefly discusses previous efforts 
and recommendations for addressing the lack of arbitrator ethics standards, and Part VI 
suggests currently available methods for addressing and remediating the effects of 
unethical arbitrator conduct.  
II.  GENERALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS 
Although there is no universal code of ethics, there are certain ethical standards 
that provider institutions, courts and commentators have agreed are essential to the 
arbitrator’s practice. This section will not present an exhaustive list. Rather, the intention 
is to give the reader an idea of the general expectations of the ethical arbitrator and to 
highlight the significance of the fact that arbitrators are not legally required to fulfill these 
expectations.  
Disclosure of conflicts of interest, such as a professional relationship with one of 
the parties or a significant financial interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceeding, is 
one major ethical standard with which arbitrators are expected to comply.8 This issue is 
addressed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),9 which has been interpreted to 
mandate that arbitrators make certain disclosures to avoid violating the “evident 
partiality” prohibition in the statute.10 
Additionally, arbitrators are expected to exercise impartiality and independent 
judgment in rendering decisions.11 This generally requires the arbitrator to refrain from 
favoritism or allowing their decisions to be influenced by participants in the arbitration 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Sabin, supra note 1, at 1337 (advocating for state arbitrator licensing boards). 
8 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 956 (identifying arbitrators’ disclosures of conflicts of interest 
as a major ethical issue in arbitration). 
9 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
10 See Holtzman, supra note 3, at 488. 
11 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 959; see also Weston, supra note 5, at 484. 
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and outside parties.12  
Avoidance of impropriety in communicating with the parties is also integral.13 
Similar to the requirement that judges avoid ex parte communications with litigants,14 it 
is desirable that arbitrators refrain from such communications with the parties to the 
arbitration to avoid prejudice.15 
Ensuring that details of the proceeding remain confidential is also significant.16 
However, this requirement is regarded as an important benefit conferred by selecting 
arbitration rather than traditional litigation and is therefore often imposed by contract or 
some other authority.17 
Other ethical standards often referenced include competence and diligence.18 
These generally refer to the expectation that the arbitrator discharge his administrative 
duties, such as rendering an award, appropriately.19 
III.   FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CURRENT LACK OF UNIFORM ARBITRATOR 
ETHICS STANDARDS  
Perhaps most importantly, arbitration is largely a private industry.20 There is no 
central regulating body responsible for policing the practices of those involved in the 
field.21 Furthermore, court involvement in the process has been limited severely by 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the FAA.22 Although arbitration is governed to an 
                                                
12 See, e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial 
Disputes, 5 para. C (2004),   https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_003867 
(explaining arbitrator impartiality). 
13 Id. 
14 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.9 (2011) (prohibiting judges from engaging in ex parte 
communications). 
15 See, e.g., Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, supra note 12 (explaining the precautions arbitrators ought to 
take when communicating with parties to the arbitration). 
16 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 962 (identifying confidentiality as a significant ethical issue 
relating to the arbitrator’s obligations). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. at 963-64 (discussing arbitrators’ expectations relating to competency). 
19 Id. 
20 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 949-50 (noting that arbitration is a mostly private process, though 
some jurisdictions permit court-ordered arbitration). 
21 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1344-45 (discussing the lack of oversight and regulation of arbitrators and the 
arbitral process). 
22 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 962 (stating that arbitrator misconduct is mostly addressed through 
challenges brought under § 10 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2010); see also Weston, supra note 5, at 455, 
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extent by the FAA, this statute does not require uniform ethical standards for 
arbitrators.23 Rather, the FAA addresses ethical issues respecting arbitrators only in a 
limited capacity by prescribing vacatur of awards where there was “evident partiality or 
corruption in the arbitrators.”24 These elements of the arbitral process render self-
regulation the only valuable means of imposing standards of conduct on arbitrators.25  
Arbitrators may operate in conjunction with a private provider institution, such as 
the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), agreeing to arbitrate cases under the 
umbrella of that institution.26 Arbitrators may also operate on an ad hoc basis, which 
means that the arbitrator works independently to administer the case.27 Consistent with 
the self-regulation scheme, most provider institutions have promulgated ethics codes 
applicable to the arbitrators associated with their organizations.28 However, not every 
party engaged in the process receives the benefits of these rules because parties may 
forgo including institutional arbitration or incorporation of institutional rules in their 
arbitration agreements.29  Additionally, some commentators have claimed that, though 
bound by these ethical codes, provider institutions often fall short with respect to 
enforcement.30 This is because such institutions fear that, by strictly enforcing their 
ethical codes, they will publicly denigrate arbitration and decrease their available roster 
of arbitrators.31 What is more, these rules “do not have the force of law” and therefore 
cannot serve as a source of liability in a court action in which a party challenges the 
arbitrator’s conduct.32 
Secondly, as noted previously, the Supreme Court has afforded substantial 
autonomy to arbitration.33 This point is worth underscoring separately because, through 
                                                                                                                                            
458 (discussing the Supreme Court’s significant deference to arbitration and the FAA’s “limited vacatur 
remedy” for unethical arbitrator conduct). 
23 See 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
24 Id. 
25 See Kristen M. Blankley, Lying, Stealing, And Cheating: The Role Of Arbitrators As Ethics Enforcers, 52 
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 443, 463 (2014) (“[T]he law and courts have been relatively ‘hands off’ regarding 
arbitration issues . . . [w]ith no one assuming the role of overseeing arbitration.”); see also Holtzman, 
supra, note 3, at 481 (explaining that the field of arbitration employs self-regulation as the primary means 
of addressing the ethical conduct of arbitrators). 
26 See Blankley, supra note 25, at 471 (distinguishing between institutional and ad hoc arbitration). 
27 See id. 
28 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 978. 
29 See id.; see also Blankley, supra note 25, at 473. 
30 See Weston, supra note 5, at 469. 
31 See id. 
32 Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Props., 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001) discussed in Holtzman, 
supra note 3, at 481. 
33 See Weston, supra note 5, at 455; see also Sabin, supra note 1, at 1347. 
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doctrines such as federal preemption and through many individual decisions, the Court 
has progressively and consistently afforded almost complete deference to arbitrator 
decisions. In so doing, the Court has solidified arbitration’s independence.34 This level of 
support from the Supreme Court renders even the best efforts at establishing uniform 
ethics standards futile. 
Additionally, the fundamental tenets of arbitration are efficiency, economy, and 
expertise, not the arbitrator’s penchant for ethical conduct.35 High standards of conduct 
are not as strongly emphasized for arbitrators as they are for judges, whose functions are 
similar to those of the arbitrator.36 This de-prioritization of arbitrator ethics contributes to 
the lack of universal standards. If such standards were regarded as essential in the arbitral 
process, provider institutions and parties with significant leverage, such as large 
corporations who repeatedly arbitrate disputes, would demand that a universal code of 
arbitrator ethics be adopted. 
Moreover, often arbitrators are hired by repeat players: parties who consistently 
resolve disputes through arbitration.37  In some instances, the arbitrator a party selects is 
one with whom that party has a relationship outside of the arbitral process.38 Over time, a 
trusting relationship may develop between these individuals.39 As a result, the repeat 
player, despite having at least some leverage to influence the process, may be less 
inclined to demand universal standards of arbitrator ethics. 
The issue is compounded by the doctrine of arbitral or quasi-judicial immunity.40 
This doctrine, which will be explored further in Part IV, shields arbitrators from personal 
liability for actions taken for the purpose of fulfilling their functions, even if such acts are 
unethical and improper.41  
Finally, arbitrators are typically highly skilled professionals, such as lawyers or 
experienced players in the commercial industry.42 As an incident of their membership in 
their respective professions, these arbitrators are often bound by a formal code of ethics 
                                                
34 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1350. 
35 See id. at 1360 (discussing the primary goals of arbitration). 
36 See id. at 1345 (noting that judges arbitrators have “little accountability” in comparison to arbitrators). 
37 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 956 (describing the “repeat player effect”); see also Nancy A. 
Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 399-400 
(2010) (explaining the repeat player issue as well as its implications for parties who are inexperienced with 
arbitration). 
38 See Welsh, supra note 37 at 398-99 (explaining the practice of appointing arbitrators with whom one has 
a pre-existing “special relationship”). 
39 See id. 
40 See Weston, supra note 5, at 493. 
41 See Weston, supra note 5, at 493. 
42 See Holtzman, supra note 3, at 482. 
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imposed by their field.43 The need for a separate code of arbitrator ethics may therefore 
seem redundant.  
Whatever the reasons for the lack of uniform standards of arbitrator ethics, the 
consequences of not having such standards can produce dire results. Haworth v. Superior 
Court is illustrative.44 In that case, the parties to a dispute involving cosmetic surgery 
sought nullification of an award rendered by an arbitrator who, as a judge, had been 
disciplined for belittling colleagues based on their physical appearances.45 The arbitrator 
failed to disclose this information prior to the arbitration proceedings.46 Understandably, 
the complaining parties were concerned that the arbitrator’s ability to fairly administer 
the proceeding was hampered by his apparent repulsions.47 Despite these concerns and 
the arbitrator’s failure to disclose, the court did not vacate the arbitrator’s award and 
classified the challenge as an “after-the-fact attack[] by losing parties.”48 La Serena 
Properties, LLC v. Weisbach is also demonstrative.49 In that case, the arbitration 
agreement provided for a sole arbitrator to be jointly appointed by both parties.50 One of 
the parties, a construction firm, conspired with an arbitrator to induce its adversary to 
accept the arbitrator’s appointment.51 The arbitrator and the firm concealed the fact that 
the arbitrator was in a romantic relationship with the sister of a partner in the firm and, as 
a result, had a close relationship with the partner and his family.52 Though bound by the 
ethics rules of the provider institution, the institution did not discipline the arbitrator, nor 
was the arbitrator otherwise held accountable for his conduct, as he was protected by 
arbitral immunity.53  
                                                
43 See Weston, supra note 5, at 466-67 (explaining that the conduct of most professionals, who may serve 
as arbitrators, is subject to regulation). 
44 Haworth v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853 (2010). 
 45 Id. at 858. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 857. 
48 Id. at 871, 875 (the court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) 
set outer disclosure limits and required that parties to arbitration disclose “any dealings which might create 
an impression of possible bias.” However, here, a California statute imposed more specific disclosure 
requirements on arbitrators. The court noted that, because arbitrator’s conduct did not directly violate these 
express restrictions, a ruling in the defendant’s favor was inappropriate.). 
49 La Serena Properties, LLC v. Weisbach, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (2010). 
50 Id. at 598-99. 
51 Id. 
52 La Serena Properties, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598-99. 
53 Id. at 600, 606-07. 
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IV.   BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF ESTABLISHING A UNIFORM CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
ARBITRATORS  
A.  Benefits 
Universal ethics standards will place essential constraints on arbitrator conduct. 
The extensive authority of arbitrators renders any code of ethics particularly valuable, as 
individuals with such considerable power ought to be constrained by regulations on their 
conduct. In this respect, a code of ethics will underscore that arbitrators are not invincible 
and hold them accountable for their actions.54 
A uniform code of ethics also contributes to the integrity of the field and enables 
arbitration “to maintain . . . legal legitimacy and justice.”55 A field is more likely to 
garner respect and public confidence if its key players are subject to high standards of 
ethical conduct.56 
Enforceable ethical standards will also bolster the attractiveness of arbitration as a 
method of resolving disputes. Individuals and entities will be more willing to commit to 
arbitration with the assurance that reliable recourse is available against wrongdoing.57 
Additionally, an established code of arbitrator ethics will lessen the dilatory 
tactics of displeased parties whose motive in seeking nullification of an award is simply 
to prolong the “day of reckoning.”58 As previously noted, parties have limited ability to 
challenge arbitrator decisions.59 One of the only options is to bring an action in court 
seeking vacatur of the award.60 Litigants may be inclined to erroneously challenge the 
award by alleging arbitrator impropriety. With no established ethics code, the 
complainant has no standard with which to conform his allegations outside of case law 
related to vacatur under the FAA. An established ethics code presents a greater 
impediment for such parties who erroneously allege arbitrator misconduct as a guise for 
seeking judicial review or nullification of their award. 
Moreover, a system of uniform standards of ethics for arbitrators facilitates a 
more sustainable system of adjudication. This is accomplished with decreased challenges 
to arbitral awards and a corresponding increase in the public’s confidence in the arbitral 
                                                
54 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1345 (discussing arbitrators’ lack of accountability and emphasizing the 
importance of ethical standards to impose such accountability); see also Weston, supra note 5, at 475. 
55 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 958. 
56 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1382. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. at 980 (stating that ethics standards will prevent arbitration from being subject to “unnecessary 
challenges and increased litigation about vacation or enforcement of arbitral awards.”). 
59 See supra note 22. 
60 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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process.61 If arbitrators are held to stringent and enforced standards of conduct and 
comply with these standards, it is likely that those prone to impropriety will naturally be 
expelled from the profession or receive fewer appointments.62 This will leave a repertoire 
of arbitrators who conduct themselves and their proceedings with integrity, eliminate the 
need for some parties to challenge arbitral decisions, and achieve public trust in the 
quality of arbitrator decision-making. 
Finally, uniform ethical rules offer protection for participating parties, especially 
parties to adhesive arbitration agreements and those who are at an economic disadvantage 
relative to their opponents. As some commentators opine, the vulnerability of such parties 
increases the need to protect them against arbitrator misconduct.63 Accordingly, the 
constraints of compliance with ethical rules help ensure that the arbitrator treats such 
individuals fairly.64  
B.  Limitations 
Though the benefits of a universal code of ethics for arbitrators would be 
plentiful, there are restraints on the imposition of such standards that render their 
adoption unlikely, at least in the near future.  
Enforcement of a code of ethics for arbitrators will be exceedingly difficult given 
the current status of arbitration. As one commentator has opined, “[d]ue to the 
unregulated nature of the arbitration practice . . . enforcement of [uniform ethics] rules is 
difficult, if not impossible.”65 The current barriers to establishing a uniform code of 
arbitrator ethics are insurmountable because there is no single entity with the authority to 
impose such a code on all arbitrators and sanction violators for noncompliance.66 
The costs associated with establishing a uniform code of ethics present another 
limitation to its adoption.67 Arbitration has long been touted as a less expensive 
alternative to traditional litigation.68 The imposition of a code of ethics will have 
                                                
61 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1344-45 (stating that arbitrator impropriety and unqualified autonomy partly 
contribute to the propensity of many parties to challenge awards and suggesting that oversight and 
accountability will remedy this issue). 
62 See Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns Of Elite Investment 
Arbitrators, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 47, 62 (2010) (stating that arbitrators accused of certain improprieties are 
less likely to be re-selected for future cases). 
63 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 960 (suggesting that, for the protection of parties to adhesive 
arbitration, heightened ethical standards should apply to arbitrators). 
64 See id. 
65 Weston, supra note 5, at 456. 
66 See Weston, supra note 5, at 468-69. 
67 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1380 (acknowledging that implementing uniform ethics standards, at least 
through a licensing program, has attendant costs). 
68 See id. 
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attendant expenses for all participants in arbitration that will likely be poorly received. 
For example, if the code is imposed by an entity created solely for enforcement purposes, 
such an organization will require funding that will likely be solicited from taxes, dues 
paid by arbitrators and provider institutions, or increased fees for parties engaging in 
arbitration.69 Whether one or a combination of these funding sources is employed, the 
end result will be to increase the costs of arbitration, diminish the relative economy of the 
process and, accordingly, garner little support. 
Additionally, fear of unwarranted sanctions or accusations of unethical conduct 
may discourage highly skilled and qualified arbitrators from continuing to offer their 
services. An elaborate code of ethics will provide many opportunities for parties to 
accuse arbitrators, sometimes erroneously, of impropriety.70 Though ideally the enforcer 
of the code will be equipped to discredit and eliminate wrongful accusations, fear of 
sullying  one’s reputation, being wrongly disciplined, or not being rehired and losing a 
dependable source of income may deter qualified arbitrators from becoming or remaining 
members of the field.71 The fear of being accused of violating the code may also impair 
the arbitrator’s decision-making abilities. In this respect, some arbitrators may be inclined 
to issue judgments aimed at pleasing all parties, rather than judgments based on the 
merits of the case.72  
Finally, arbitral immunity restricts the remedies parties can seek for arbitrator 
misconduct. Arbitrators are afforded immunity for acts within the scope of their duties.73 
This immunity, akin to judicial immunity, applies even when the arbitrator flagrantly 
abuses his position and engages in deplorable conduct.74 As some courts and 
commentators have explained, arbitrators are afforded this protection to, among other 
things, eliminate impediments to their decisional authority and entice qualified arbitrators 
to enter the field with the benefit of being shielded from personal liability.75 Accordingly, 
any code of ethics that is binding on all arbitrators and imposes punishments for 
violations must account for arbitral immunity and be appropriately tailored to exclude 
acts within the scope of the doctrine. This will exclude many of the behaviors that one 
would expect a code of ethics to address, such as rendering an award in which the 
arbitrator has a financial interest. 
Additionally, arbitral immunity restricts the ability of parties to sue the arbitrator 
personally for misconduct respecting activities covered by the doctrine.76 As a result, a 
                                                
69 See id. at 1380-81. 
70 See id. at 1365 (discussing the likely effects of holding arbitrators personally liable for conduct). 
71 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 956 (discussing some of the consequences arbitrators will 
likely consider when deciding whether to comply with ethical standards). 
72 See id. at 956 (stating that “compromise” awards can result where arbitrators attempt to please all parties 
for fear that they won’t be rehired). 
73 See Holtzman, supra note 3, at 482. 
74 See Weston, supra note 5, at 458. 
75 See Weston, supra note 5, at 484. 
76 See id.; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 962. 
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code of ethics cannot provide parties with the option of seeking recourse from the 
individual arbitrator. This is a stark contrast to other professions that permit personal 
liability for certain conduct that harms the aggrieved party.77  
V.  PAST EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS FOR ESTABLISHING UNIVERSAL ARBITRATOR ETHICS 
STANDARDS  
One approach that has been proposed is “expanded judicial review of arbitration 
awards” to more effectively protect against arbitrator impropriety.78 The rationale is that, 
by expanding the scope of judicial scrutiny, arbitrators will become more accountable 
and will be less likely to behave improperly, as they would be on notice of the possibility 
that a court will closely examine the process by which they arrived at their decision.79 
This method faces several challenges. The Supreme Court’s emphatic policy disfavoring 
extended judicial interference in the arbitral process renders it likely that the Court will 
disallow this approach.80 Further, arbitrators are not required to provide written opinions, 
a fact which substantially impedes any judicial review.81 Finally, expanded judicial 
review will often extend proceedings and impose greater costs on the parties involved.82 
At least one commentator has advocated for the establishment of state arbitrator 
licensing boards responsible for enacting ethics codes.83 This entity would control both 
the credentials and other requirements necessary for becoming an arbitrator and the 
standards of conduct by which all arbitrators are bound.84 The board would also sanction 
arbitrators for violations of the code and render violations a crime, so as to evade the 
hurdle of arbitral immunity.85  
This plan is impressive and would be an excellent method of imposing a code of 
ethics on all arbitrators wishing to practice in the field. However, the recommendation is 
too ambitious given the current arbitral climate. The mostly private nature of arbitration 
and states’ limited ability to regulate the process present significant impediments. Also, 
the cost of this scheme would be substantial and would likely be shouldered by reluctant, 
if not unwilling, tax payers and players in the arbitral process.   
Another proposed solution is amendment of the FAA permitting vacatur where a 
party proves that an arbitrator engaged in certain unethical conduct, such as concealment 
                                                
77 See Weston, supra note 5, at 466-67. 
78 Sabin, supra note 1, at 1362. 
79 Id. at 1363. 
80 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587 (2008). 
81 Sabin, supra note 1, at 1363. 
82 Id. at 1363-64. 
83 Id. at 1369. 




of a conflict of interest in an effort to secure appointment.86 As previously stated, the 
FAA already permits vacatur for some unethical conduct, such as partiality and 
corruption.87 This addition would enable parties to invalidate the proceeding where the 
arbitrator has engaged in other forms of unsavory conduct. Though attractive, this method 
is not particularly feasible. First, any such amendments “may have to be preceded by a 
shift in the federal attitude favoring arbitration’s status quo.”88 Additionally, the arbitrator 
would not be held accountable for his conduct until after the fact.89 Even then, true 
accountability will not result because the only consequences of the arbitrator’s behavior 
would be nullification of the award and potential forfeiture of repeat employment by the 
involved parties.90 As one commentator has noted, “the problem is that if an award is not 
confirmed or is vacated, the punishment did not fit the crime . . . [t]here is no economic 
impact on the arbitrator, who is immune from civil liability.”91 Moreover, this remedy 
will harm the complaining party, who will then be saddled with the financial burden of 
completing another arbitration or initiating a lawsuit to resolve the dispute.92 
Noting that there is limited judicial inquiry into the arbitrator’s conduct, due in 
part to arbitral immunity, one commentator has suggested that the doctrine be modified to 
afford only qualified immunity.93 According to this proponent, qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is appropriate because unlike judges, arbitrators are not accountable to 
the public and are subject to “minimal appellate review.”94 Additionally, injunctive relief 
is ordinarily not available to delay the judgment of an arbitrator suspected of wrongdoing 
and there is no mandate that an arbitrator provide a written public record of their 
decisions, which shields them from public scrutiny.95 Thus, under a qualified immunity 
doctrine, arbitrators would be responsible for misconduct respecting the arbitration 
proceedings and abuses of their position would no longer go unpunished.96 The 
proponent of this method underscored the final and binding nature of the process as an 
additional justification for prohibiting absolute protection of an arbitrator’s unethical 
                                                
86 Id. at 1366. 
87 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
88 Sabin, supra note 1, at 1367. 
89 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 4, at 961 (stating that ethical challenges, such as conflicts of interest are 
“raised after the fact when the losing party challenges the arbitral award”). 
90 See id.  
91 Holtzman, supra note 3, at 495. 
92 Id. 






conduct.97 One limitation of this approach, however, is that it does not provide pre-
proceeding protection from arbitrator impropriety. 
Some commentators, professional organizations, and states have proposed and 
adopted ethical rules for arbitrators.98 None of these standards are universally applicable 
to all arbitrators,99 but they nevertheless provide useful guidance as to what a universal 
code of ethics ought to include and may, in the future, be used as guides to formulate 
such a code. 
One such code is The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes.100 
A product of the joint effort of American Bar Association and American Arbitration 
Association members, this code “sets forth generally accepted standards of ethical 
conduct for the guidance of arbitrators and parties in commercial disputes.”101 In the 
preamble, the authors emphasize the importance of arbitrator accountability, the resultant 
need to ensure that arbitrators comply with “high standards” of ethical conduct and the 
importance of maintaining public confidence in arbitration.102 The code includes ten 
canons and sets standards for, among other things, disclosure, avoidance of impropriety 
or the appearance of impropriety, and rendering fair and independent judgments.103 
California, in addition to other states, has also established standards of conduct for 
arbitrators.104 California’s Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual 
Arbitration is a comprehensive compilation of ethical standards of conduct.105 The code 
applies to “all persons serving as a neutral arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration 
agreement” that is governed by the California Code of Civil Procedure and designates 
California as the forum for the arbitration.106 The stated purposes mirror some of the 
major justifications for universal standards of ethical conduct: providing arbitrators 
                                                
97 Id. at 491. 
98 See, e.g., Sabin supra note 1, at 1369. 
99 See Holtzman, supra note 3, at 483 (describing proposed ethics codes and standards as “wholly 
aspirational”). 
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guidance in performing their duties, protecting parties to arbitration, encouraging public 
confidence in the arbitral process, ensuring arbitrator accountability, and maintaining the 
“integrity and fairness” of the arbitral process.107 The standards disclaim that grounds for 
vacatur are derived from the FAA and that the intention is not to create new civil causes 
of action or affect any existing civil cause of action, but caution that violation of the 
standards may fall within the scope of vacatur under the FAA.108 The standards regulate, 
among other things, disclosures of conflicts of interest, disqualification, duties and 
limitations respecting future professional relationships, confidentiality and ex parte 
communications.109 
Finally, some commentators have suggested that a code of ethics adopted from 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct may be appropriate for arbitrators due to the 
similarities in the functions of arbitrators and judges.110 Standards addressed by the Code 
of Judicial Conduct include impartiality, the effect of personal interests on decision-
making, ex parte communications, and promotion of confidence in the judiciary.111 
Although other proposed codes of arbitrator ethics mirror some of the standards included 
in the Code of Judicial Conduct, critics disfavor this approach.112 This is in part because 
of the differences in the public nature of the judiciary and the private nature of arbitration 
as well as the “transdisciplinary” aspect of arbitration.113 
VI.   PARTY RECOURSE FOR ADDRESSING AND REMEDIATING THE EFFECTS OF 
UNETHICAL ARBITRATOR CONDUCT 
Despite the current lack of universal ethics standards, there are some preventative 
and remedial steps available to parties to address arbitrator impropriety. Recourse is 
admittedly limited. However, acting in accordance with one or more of these 
recommendations may nevertheless be helpful.  
First, careful selection of arbitrators is crucial. Parties should approach the 
arbitrator selection process as one of the most important tasks relative to the proceeding. 
Selecting an arbitrator with impeccable repute in her professional community as well as a 
longstanding record of impartiality and integrity will decrease the likelihood that one will 
be forced to accuse the arbitrator of unethical conduct after the proceedings have 
begun.114 This can be accomplished by, for example, selecting arbitrators who are past 




110 See Sabin, supra note 1, at 1378. 
111 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011). 
112 Sabin, supra note 1, at 1380. 
113 Id. 
114 See Kapeliuk, supra note 62, at 64-65 (discussing the relationship between an arbitrator’s reputation and 
the arbitrator selection process). 
 
 217 
judges or who are widely known and respected in their field, and by conducting 
investigations to determine whether the arbitrator has been accused or sanctioned for 
unethical conduct in his principal profession. Additionally, parties can appoint 
institutional arbitrators whose names are available through the associated institution’s 
directory.115 This would simplify the research process. 
Including certain provisions in the arbitration agreement will also be helpful. 
Where practicable, parties should consider arbitrating their disputes through a provider 
institution, such as JAMS or the AAA, by stipulating as such in the arbitral agreement. 
The agreement should also expressly incorporate the ethics rules of the chosen provider 
institution.116 This mandates that the arbitrator’s actions comport with the established 
ethical standards of the provider institution and provides a mechanism for the imposition 
of sanctions if the arbitrator violates the rules.117 Such sanctions may not be as severe as 
those prescribed for violation of other uniform professional codes of ethics, but will still 
afford the benefit of oversight and accountability.118  
Another useful contractual provision is one that entitles the parties to dismiss the 
arbitrator during the proceeding and retain some or all of the fees paid in the event of 
dismissal if the arbitrator behaves improperly. This empowers parties to avoid the final 
and binding judgment of a corrupt or unethical arbitrator. This will likely cost parties 
time and money, despite the return of fees.119 However, the imposition of these costs will 
be outweighed by the parties’ relief from the binding judgment of an arbitrator who is 
without scruples.  
With evidence that their arbitrator has engaged in unethical conduct, parties may 
also report the arbitrator to the ethics board of her principal profession, if applicable. For 
example, if the arbitrator is a lawyer by profession, parties may notify the bar association 
of the state in which the arbitrator is admitted to practice. In some instances, the conduct 
may violate the rules of the organization and may therefore be cause for professional 
discipline.  
Finally, though an extremely limited remedy, parties can seek to have the award 
of an unethical arbitrator vacated by filing suit.120 Courts rarely afford relief to parties in 
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this manner, as the FAA’s grounds for vacatur are “extraordinarily difficult to meet.”121 
Moreover, parties who elect this approach would be responsible for the costs of bringing 
suit.122 However, if it is financially feasible, otherwise prudent and there is no other 
option to remedy the harm caused, this course of action is worth a try. 
VII.   CONCLUSION  
Given the nature of the arbitrator’s role and the limited availability of judicial 
review, all arbitrators ought to be subject to uniform standards of ethical conduct 
subjecting wrongdoers to sanctions for violation. The benefits of these standards, such as 
ensuring arbitrator accountability and protecting the integrity of the arbitral process, 
render their adoption attractive.  
However, the current autonomous status of arbitration is not amenable to such a 
scheme. The Supreme Court, in rendering decisions and interpreting the FAA, has 
afforded near unwavering deference to the decisional authority of arbitrators.123 Thus, 
despite the commendable efforts that some states and entities have made to adopt uniform 
standards, it is improbable that national standards regulating the conduct of arbitrators 
will be established in the near future.  
As a result, parties must take steps to protect themselves in the event that their 
arbitrator engages in unsavory conduct.  Parties must also be aware of their limited post-
proceeding recourse for challenging arbitral awards and bringing civil suits against 
arbitrators on the basis of impropriety. To that end, prudent selection of arbitrators, 
careful contract drafting, and selection of institutional arbitration or ethical rules are 
advisable. Whatever method is chosen, it is imperative that parties are proactive, as this 
approach helps ensure that parties evade the burdens of a non-existent uniform code of 
arbitrator ethics.
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